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In In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, ' the Court of Common
Pleas of Alleqheny Ccunty held the director of Pittsburgh Action
Against Rape (PAAR),2 a rape crisis center, in contempt of court for
her refusal to release records of communications between crisis
center personnel and a rape victim. The common pleas court im-
posed the contempt citation during the Commonwealth's criminal
prosecution of the defendant for rape. Defense counsel, on cross-
examination, requested examination of PAAR records to determine
whether the victim had made any prior inconsistent statements to
PAAR counselors during therapy sessions. The victim did not con-
sent to release of the records and the director therefore declined to
produce them, relying on the confidential nature of the relationship
between a rape victim and a rape counselor. Faced with a jail sen-
tence for contempt, the PAAR director obtained a stay from the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.3
On appeal, the PAAR director claimed an absolute privilege for
all communications between a rape crisis counselor and the rape vic-
tim.4 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in January 1981 that
rape crisis counselors did not have an absolute testimonial privilege;
rather, counselors could be compelled to produce certain records at a
defendant's request.5 The court, however, did limit its holding to
records that are written statements6 and notes that are verbatim ac-
counts of the victim's statements and that have been verified by the
1. - Pa. -, 428 A.2d 126 (1981).
2. Pittsburgh Action Against Rape (PAAR) is a private, non-profit corporation that pro-
vides counseling to victims of sexual assault. PAAR is one of twenty-seven rape crisis centers
in Pennsylvania. Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, Annual Report, 1980 (on file in office of the
Dickinson Law Review).
3. Pursuant to a petition to assume extraordinary jurisdiction, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court invoked its plenary jurisdiction to review the order of the Court of Common
Pleas of Allegheny County.
4. In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, - Pa.-, -, 428 A.2d 126, 127 (1981).
5. Id at -, 428 A.2d at 131-32.
6. Only "statements" of the rape victim, and not interpretations or recollections of the
PAAR counselor, are available. Id at -, 428 A.2d at 132.
victim.
7
For many rape crisis centers, the PAAR decision, although a
step in the right direction, did not go far enough.' The staff of these
centers believed that the limitation of the privilege, as defined by the
court, would hinder their effectiveness.9 Members of the Penn-
sylvania Legislature apparently agreed when they enacted a statute
to make communications between a rape victim and rape crisis
center counselors privileged in criminal or civil proceedings, without
prior written consent of the victim.'0 Thus, the legislation effectively
overturned the PAAR holding.
This comment examines the testimonial privilege as it relates to
the rape crisis counselor, the role of rape crisis centers," and the
elements that must be weighed in granting a privilege.' 2 Constitu-
tional considerations receive particular attention.'" Finally, the
comment analyzes the present protection accorded rape counselors
7. Id
8. See Pennsylvania Law Journal-Reporter, Feb. 9, 1981, at 5, col. 1; Bucks County
Courier Times, May 6, 1981, at A-8, col. 1; Beaver County Times, May 6, 1981, at A-3, col. 1;
Pittsburgh Press, June 24, 1981, at B-2, col. 1.
9. The Pennsylvania Commission for Women reports that the work of rape crisis cen-
ters has been impeded in two ways by summons to court: (1) the valuable time of counselors
has been diverted from clients as the counselors are tied up in court, and (2) some rape victims
have been discouraged from using the centers in fear that what they confide to counselors may
become public knowledge. Towanda Daily Review, May 20, 1981.
10. The recent Pennsylvania enactment provides the following:
§ 5945.1 Confidential communications to sexual assault counselors.
(a) Definitions.-As used in this section the following words and phrases shall
have the meanings given to them in this subsection:
"Rape crisis center." Any office, institution or center offering assistance to vic-
tims of sexual assault and their families through crisis intervention, medical and legal
accompaniment and follow-up counseling.
"Sexual assault counselor." A person who is engaged in any office, institution or
center defined as a rape crisis center under this section, who has undergone 40 hours
of training and is under the control of a direct services supervisor of a rape crisis
center, whose primary purpose is the rendering of advice, counseling or assistance to
victims of sexual assault.
"Victim." A person who consults a sexual assault counselor for the purpose of
securing advice, counseling or assistance concerning a mental, physical or emotional
condition caused by a sexual assault.
"Confidential communication." Information transmitted between a victim of
sexual assault and a sexual assault counselor in the course of that relationship and in
confidence by a means which, so far as the victim is aware, does not disclose the
information to a third person other than those who are present to further the interests
of the victim in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary
for the transmission of the information or an accomplishment of the purposes for
which the sexual assault counselor is consulted. The term includes all information
received by the sexual assault counselor in the course of that relationship.
(b) Privilege.-A sexual assault counselor has a privilege not to be examined as a
witness in any civil or criminal proceeding without the prior written consent of the
victim being counseled by the counselor as to any confidential communication made
by the victim to the counselor as to any advice, report or working paper given or
made in the course of the consultation.
Amendment to the Act of November 25, 1970, Act No. 169, 1981 Pa. Legis. Serv. - (to be
codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5945.1). See also notes 193-203 and accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 15-57 and accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 58-137 and accompanying text infra
13. See notes 138-184 and accompanying text iqra
in light of the recent legislative reform in Pennsylvania. 4
II. The Emergence of Rape Crisis Centers
A. Background
The crime of rape'5 became a major issue in the past decade.
Of all the categories of violent crime, none has increased more rap-
idly and consistently than this form of sexual assault.' 6 The wo-
men's movement1 7 provided the driving force to direct attention to
rape and its social and psychological implications for rape victims.'8
The emergence and development of rape crisis centers is an out-
growth of this movement.' 9
Rape centers first appeared in the early 1970s2° with pioneering
efforts in Philadelphia, Chicago, Detroit, and the District of Colum-
bia.21 Typically, the early crisis centers began operations with little
funding and a staff composed of volunteers, many of whom were
themselves victims of rape.22 In an effort to provide the best possible
support for rape victims, volunteers worked with police departments,
hospital administrators, district attorneys, and the media.23
Rape crisis centers have made significant progress over the last
14. See notes 185-205 and accompanying text ifra
15. Rape at common law was recognized as unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman by
force and against her will. See Commonwealth v. Stephens, 433 Pa. Super. Ct. 394, 17 A.2d
919 (1941); Commonwealth v. Moon, 151 Pa. Super. Ct. 555, 30 A.2d 704 (1943). The current
statutory definition of rape in Pennsylvania provides as follows:
A person commits a felony of the first degree when he engages in sexual intercourse
with another person not his spouse: (1) by forcible compulsion; (2) by threat of forci-
ble compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution;
(3) who is unconscious; or (4) who is so mentally deranged or deficient that such
person is incapable of consent.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Purdon 1973).
16. "Between 1968 and 1977 the Uniform Crime Reports made available by the FBI
indicated that rape was the fastest growing violent crime in the United States. During that
time, the number of reported incidents of rape increased 103% (from 31,000 to 63,020)." D.
CARRow, RAPE: GUIDELINES FOR A COMMUNITY RESPONSE, prepared for the National Insti-
tute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,
U.S. Dept. of Justice by ABT Associates, Inc., 1 (1980), citing UNITED STATES DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (1977) (Wash. D.C., Govt. Printing Office, 1978).
17. Other groups that have initiated programs through the women's movement include
Women Against Rape (W.A.R.) and STOP rape groups.
18. B. BROWN, A FREEDMAN, H. KATZ & A. PRICE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW
(1977).
19. D. CARROW, srupra note 16, at 3.
20. Until the early 1970s, the community response to rape involved only three major
agencies--the police, the hospital, and the prosecutor. "Their response included no special
consideration for the nature of the offense committed against the victim." Id at 33.
21. Id at 3. A group of Washington, D.C. volunteers started one of the first rape crisis
centers to receive national attention. The Washington Center published a manual, "How to
Start a Rape Crisis Center," which has been used extensively by other groups. A. BURGESS &
L. HOLMSTROM, RAPE: CRISIS AND RECOVERY 150 (1979).
22. D. CARROW, supra note 16, at 3.
23. A PENNSYLVANIA COMMISSION WOMEN RESEARCH GUIDE, HELP FOR THE RAPE
VICTIM (rev. ed. 1980) (on file in office of Dickinson Law Review) [hereinafter cited as HELP
FOR THE RAPE VICTIM].
several years24 and are no longer considered a radical alternative.25
Currently, many communities recognize that rape is a widespread
problem requiring comprehensive services to facilitate the victim's
recovery.26 In addition, the services provided by rape centers may
aid the criminal justice system. Encouraging victims to use the cen-
ters and cooperate with the counselors increases the likelihood that
rape victims will come forward and report the crime.27
B. Victim Services
Rape crisis centers offer a host of services to the victim, 28 in-
cluding crisis and information hotlines;29 short and long-term coun-
seling;30 escort services;3  anonymous reporting;32  and, in some
cases, transportation, child care, and emergency housing.33 Often,
these crisis intervention services are provided free of charge to the
24. Nationally, over 400 independent centers and 600 community based rape-related
programs have been established since the early 1970s. Many of these centers have joined to
form the National Coalition Against Rape. PAAR Annual Report, 1980, supra note 2.
25. D. CARROW, supra note 16, at 34.
26. In the Allegheny County area, for example, an Interagency Task Force on Rape-
Related Services has been created. Membership includes the Allegheny County Police, the
Allegheny County Medical Society, the Allegheny County Crime Lab, the Center for Victims
of Violent Crime, the Hospital Council of Western Pennsylvania, and other local groups.
PAAR Annual Report, 1980, supra note 2.
27. The FBI notes that rape is one of the most under-reported crimes in the United
States. According to statistics gathered by the FBI, 57 adult women out of every 100,000 wo-
men were reported victims of rape in the United States in 1977. The rate was 68 victims out of
every 100,000 women in metropolitan areas. The FBI estimated that the number of actual
occurrences during that period was 3.5 to 9 times greater than the reported occurrences.
UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (1977) (Wash. D.C., Govt.
Printing Office, 1978) [hereinafter cited as FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS).
28. Rape crisis centers offer their services to both male and female rape victims. Because
the overwhelming number of rape victims are female, this comment uses the female pronoun.
See The Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape, Annual Report 1980-1981 (on file in office of
the Dickinson Law Review).
29. The typical rape crisis hotline uses the following procedure:
The counselor or on-call volunteer talks briefly with the victim to determine where
she is, what has happened, and what kind of help she needs. The counselor provides
empathetic listening, and the victim is further encouraged to communicate by the
counselor's feedback of what she perceives the victim's situation to be ...
D. CARROW, supra note 16, at 8.
30. One of the primary purposes of counseling is to help the victim deal with the emo-
tional aspects of the rape experience. The short-term counseling has as its "immediate objec-
tives the reduction of the psychological trauma of the victim and in some cases, improvement
of victim cooperation." D. CARROW, supra note 16, at 16. The long-term counseling element
shares similar objectives. Id at 19-20. See A. BURGESS & L. HOLMSTROM, supra note 21, at
217-52, for a discussion of a typical rape victim's case history.
31. Escort services offer a rape victim an advocate/counselor who will remain with her
through the major steps of the criminal justice response, including the medical examination,
the police investigation, and the prosecution of the accused attacker. D. CARROW, supra note
16, at 4. The escort worker attempts to allay fears and to offer empathic support as the victim
continues through the legal process. Id at 22.
32. Rape crisis centers will take reports from victims anonymously. The center simply
identifies the report by means of an assigned case number rather than individual names, or
submits the report to police with all identifying information omitted. Without a victim confi-
dentiality privilege, the center may have to reveal the anonymous records it has available. Id
at 28.
33. Id at 30.
viCtim.
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C. The Victim's Emotional Reactions
Many rape victims experience some form of physical or psycho-
logical problems from forcible sexual assaults. 31 Observations of re-
searchers and medical personnel reveal that rape victims suffer a
common sequential pattern of emotional reactions, deemed the
"rape trauma syndrome." 36 Although not all victims exhibit identi-
cal emotional patterns, "virtually all [of them] experience some of
the emotions described and, therefore, the rape trauma syndrome
provides a useful means to discuss the general reactions of victims to
a rape experience."37
Rape trauma consists of two phases: first, the immediate or
acute phase, in which the victim's lifestyle is completely disrupted by
the rape crisis; and second, the long-term phase, in which the victim
must reorganize this disrupted lifestyle.38 Emotional, physical, and
behavioral stress reactions to this life-threatening event are included
in the syndrome. 39 These symptoms can be alleviated if victims re-
ceive supportive counseling.' For some rape victims it is easier and
safer to seek direction from family members or friends. Others pre-
fer the services of rape crisis centers.4 ' The twenty-four hour tele-
phone hotline and the individual counseling sessions are the core of
the supportive services offered to victims of sexual assault.42
34. Id at 20.
35. The following account of one woman's trauma captures some of the distressing and
repetitive symptoms that a rape victim experiences:
I experienced so much during those first two months; hurt, anxiety, anger, frustration,
humiliation, and worst of all, the sense that I was having a nervous breakdown. I
thought that my feelings were not normal. I couldn't even sleep with my hus-
band. . . . I couldn't understand what was happening. Would I ever be able to put
this ordeal behind me.
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON RAPE RELATED SERVICES, A HANDBOOK FOR RAPE VICTIMS,
cited in In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, - Pa. -, -, 428 A.2d 126, 138 (1981).
36. See A. BURGESS & L. HOLMSTROM, supra note 21; S. McCombie, Characteristics of
Rape Victims Seen in Crisis Intervention, 46 SMITH COLLEGE STUDIES IN SOCIAL WORK 137
(1976); S. Sutherland & D. Sherl, Crisis Intervention with Victinu of Rape, 17 SOCIAL WORK 37
(1972).
37. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW EN-
FORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FORCIBLE RAPES-FINAL
PROJECT REPORT 21 (1978) (Washington, D.C., Govt. Printing Office, 1978) [hereinafter cited
as FORCIBLE RAPE-FINAL PROJECT REPORT].
38. For a complete discusion of rape trauma syndrome, see A. BURGESS & L. HOLM-
STROM, supra note 21, at 35-47.
39. Id
40. Id
41. Rape crisis centers have provided services for over 16,000 victims of sexual assault in
the past five years. HELP FOR THE RAPE VICTIM, supra note 23, at 4.
42. See PAR Annual Report, 1980, supra note 2.
D. Rape Crisis Center Personnel
As visibility and demand for services grew,43 rape centers found
it necessary to add salaried staff members to maintain effective com-
munity programs. 44 An increase in the educational activities pro-
vided and the services offered by many of the rape crisis centers
made it financially impractical to continue on a volunteer basis.45
Additionally, some centers employ one or more professional coun-
selors who are available to consult with individual victims or to
screen potential volunteers.' The majority of centers, however, con-
tinue to rely heavily on non-professional staffs and specially trained
volunteers to provide personal support for rape victims. 47 Neverthe-
less, before any contact with clients is permitted, all rape crisis per-
sonnel must attend special training sessions, which address
counseling techniques, criminal justice procedures, medical proce-
dures in a rape case, and other specialized topics.
4 8
E. Organizational Arrangement
Most of the early rape crisis centers were independent organiza-
tions.49 This type of program was the only option available because
many communities were neither "willing [nor] able to provide the
necessary financial and philosophical commitment needed to estab-
lish a center as part of its operation."50 Some centers deliberately
chose the independent organization structure, however, because this
structure permitted program autonomy and impartiality, both of
43. A 1977 survey revealed that the majority of law enforcement jurisdictions had some
type of counseling available for rape victims. The percentage was extremely high in the largest
jurisdictions and in university communities. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FORCIBLE RAPE: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE RESPONSES BY POLICE-
POLICE VOLUME I (Wash. D.C., Govt. Printing Office, 1977) at 32 (hereinafter cited as FORCI-
BLE RAPE: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE RESPONSE BY POLICE).
44. A survey of 31 rape crisis centers conducted in 1978 by ABT Associates found the
average number of paid staff to be 4.42. Paid staff included full-time and part-time staff. P.
MILLS, THE RAPE INTERVENTION RESOURCE MANUAL 426 (1977). See also D. CARROW,
supra note 16, at 61.
45. The number of active volunteers for most centers ranges between 30 and 40. D.
CARROW, supra note 16, at 67.
46. "According to a 1977 survey of police agencies, 82% of the cities in which counseling
services were available employed specially trained paraprofessionals, either exclusively or in
combinations with professionals. Results of a 1975 survey of 47 centers showed that 91 % of
the unpaid staff and 26% of the paid staff were non-professionals." Id at 16.
47. Id at 60.
48. Id at 64. The Erie Rape Crisis Center, for example, employs a rigorous selection
process for rape counselors. The applicant undergoes three initial interviews and two person-
ality tests; then the applicant receives 100 hours of training. After the training period, the
applicant and one of the counselors work together on a case. Upon satisfactory completion of
the case, the applicant is accepted as a rape counselor. Telephone interview with Joan Martin,
Director of Erie County Rape Crisis Center (Sept. 25, 1981).
49. A survey of 31 centers showed that 15 of the 31 centers were independent programs.
D. CARROW, supra note 16, at 35.
50. Id at 35.
which were deemed important attributes.5
In contrast to the independent structure of the majority of cen-
ters, a number of rape crisis centers were established under the aegis
of a larger organization. 2 The types of organizational affiliations
range from criminal justice agencies 53 to private organizations 54 and,
in a few instances, to the incorporation of the rape crisis center into
governmental agencies and police departments." In addition to en-
joying a firm base of funding, affiliated centers gain legitimacy in the
public eye because of their ties to the community.
56
Today, rape crisis centers perform a vital function in helping
victims of rape return to a normal lifestyle. These centers further
serve the interests of society by encouraging victims of rape to report
the assault." To implement the goals of rape crisis centers, the com-
munications between the rape victim and the crisis counselor should
be privileged.
III. Extension of a Testimonial Privilege to Rape Victim Crisis
Counselor Communications
In many states confidential communications between certain
professionals and their clients or patients are privileged.58 Few
courts or legislatures, however, extend a privilege to the rape victim-
crisis counselor relationship.59 In exploring the need for this privi-
lege, the instant analysis focuses on the current law regarding testi-
monial privileges, the precedent in Pennsylvania for such a privilege,
and the Wigmore Test.6°
A4. Testimonial Privileges in General
American courts have long recognized that it is the duty of
every person to give testimony when called upon to do so. 6' A privi-
51. Id at 34. Independent organizations are not without their disadvantages: "Chief
among these are funding difficulties, lack of credibility, lack of accountability, potential con-
flicts with the criminal justice system, and a potentially narrow base of community support."
Id at 36.
52. Id at 40.
53. Many centers are affiliated with district attorneys' offices. Id at 41.
54. Private agencies such as the Young Women's Christian Association, church organiza-
tions, or women's clubs may be available as sponsors for rape crisis centers in some communi-
ties. Id at 43.
55. For example, some rape crisis programs have been incorporated into the Department
of Human Services or the Health Department. Id at 45.
56. Id at 46.
57. See notes 111-115 and accompanying text infra
58. See notes 67-75 and accompanying text infra.
59. Only California and Pennsylvania have accorded protection to rape victim-crisis
counselor communications. See notes 194-204 and accompanying text infra
60. See notes 93-99 and accompanying text infra
61. See, e.g., Blakner v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250
U.S. 273 (1919); McMann v. S.E.C., 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1936).
lege62 is an exception to this general rule because it exempts certain
individuals in specific relationships6a from the usual requirement of
testifying. The notion of privileged communications originated in
seventeenth century England as a judically recognized "point of
honor" among gentlemen not to reveal confidential communica-
tions. 4 The English courts repudiated this general rule of honor as a
justification for the privilege in 1776.65 With the disappearance of
the old theory, a new rationale emerged: the assurance of confidenti-
ality was necessary to protect certain socially valued relationships.66
Traditionally, society sought to protect the relationships of hus-
band-wife,67 attorney-client,68 physician-patient, 69 and priest-peni-
tent.70 Recently, however, the law has accorded protection to other
relationships that render valuable services to society. 7I Relation-
ships to which the privilege has been extended include psychiatrist-
patient,72 psychologist-client,73 clinical social worker-client,74 and
62. Fisher defines privileges as
evidentiary rules designed to protect the confidential nature of certain disclosures of
which it is deemed less important that fact finding bodies and the general public gain
knowledge than it is to maintain their confidentiality. "Their sole warrant is the pro-
tection of interests and relationships which, rightly or wrongly, are regarded as of
sufficient social importance to justify some incidental sacrifice of facts needed in the
administration of justice."
Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Professions and the Law of Privileged Communications, 10
WAYNE L. REV. 609, 609-10 (1964) (quoting McCormick, The Scope ofPrivilege in the Law of
Evidence, 16 TEx. L. REV. 447, 447-48 (1938)).
63. See notes 67-75 and accompanying text infra.
64. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290, at 543 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
65. Duchess of Kingston's Case, 20 How. St. Tr. 586 (1776). See generally J. WIGMORE,
supra note 64, § 2286, at 531.
66, See J. WIGMORE, supra note 64, § 2291, at 545-54; Louissel, Confidentiality, Conform-
ity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101 (1956); McCormick,
The Scope of Privileges in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEX. L. REV. 447 (1938).
67. Most states have replaced the common-law husband-wife privilege with statutory en-
actments. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 970 (West 1966); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5923, 5914
(1980).
68. The attorney-client privilege is recognized in all jurisdictions. 3 S. GARD, JONES ON
EVIDENCE § 21.8 (6th ed. 1972). In most states the attorney-client privilege is in statutory form
and enjoys the broadest scope of all privileged communications with the fewest exceptions.
See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 952 (West Supp. 1981); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5916, 5928 (1980).
69. No physician-patient privilege existed at common law. See J. WIGMORE, supra note
64, § 2380. The privilege is now provided in statutory form in many states. See, e.g., CAL.
EVID. CODE § 994 (West Supp. 1981); 42 PA. CONS, STAT. § 5929 (1980); note 83 infra.
70. In the majority of states, the priest-penitent privilege is in statutory form. See C.
McCoRMIcK, LAW OF EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1972). See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 44.040 (1979); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. § 5943 (1980).
71. A testimonial privilege comes into existence either through judicial action or, as is
more common, through statutory enactment. See Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at
the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REV. 175, 181 (1960).
72. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146d (West Supp. 1981) (communications
between psychiatrist and patient are privileged).
73. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 84-3118 (1979) (communications between licensed psy-
chologist and client accorded same privilege as conversations between attorey-client); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 5944; UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-25-8 (Supp. 1981) (communications between li-
censed psychologist and client accorded same privilege as attorney-client). See note 84 infra.
74. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 54-3213 (1979); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.425 (1610) (Supp.
1981) (communications between certified social worker and client are privileged).
teacher-student." Indeed, "privileges represent a continuing reaffir-
mation by society of the dignity even sacredness of certain relation-
ships, particularly those in which a person reveals his deepest self
most fully and unreservedly."76 The question presented here is
whether the relationship between the rape counselor and the rape
victim is one of such high societal value and delicacy that it should
be accorded similar protection under the law.
B. Precedent For Establishing a Rape Victim- Crisis Counselor
Privilege
In many respects, the function of a rape crisis counselor resem-
bles that of a psychotherapist.77 The assurance of confidentiality78 in
both instances is a prerequisite to a satisfactory relationship.79 Also,
an inherent expectation exists that whatever highly personal infor-
mation is revealed in confidence will remain undisclosed. 80 Finally,
both relationships are considered socially desirable.8'
The most obvious source of protection against disclosure of psy-
75. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-154a (West Supp. 1981) (professional com-
munications between teacher or nurse and student are privileged); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5945
(1980) (communications between guidance counselor, home and school visitor, school nurse,
or school psychologist and student are privileged).
76. Robinson, Testimonial Privilege and the School Guidance Counselor, 25 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 911, 914 (1974).
77. Fisher defines the "psychotherapeutic relationship" as
that relationship which exists between two persons (or more, where marriage counsel-
ing or group therapy is involved) where one (or more) is seeking help in the solution
of a mental problem caused by psychological and/or environmental pressure from
another whose training and status are such as to warrant other persons confiding in
him for the purpose of such help.
Fisher, supra note 62, at 617. See notes 90-92 and accompanying text infra
78. The importance of confidentiality for a successful psychotherapeutic relationship was
well-stated by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Taylor v. United States, 222
F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
Many physical ailments might be treated with some degree of effectiveness by a doc-
tor whom the patient did not trust, but a psychiatrist must have his patient's confi-
dence or he cannot help him. "The psychiatric patient confides more utterly than
anyone else in the worl. He exposes to the therapist not only what his words di-
rectly express; he lays bare his entire self, his dreams. . . .Most patients who un-
dergo psychotherapy know that this is what will be expected of them, and that they
cannot get help except on that condition. . . .It would be too much to expect them
to do so if they knew that all they say-and all that the psychiatrist learns from what
they say-may be revealed to the world from a witness stand."
Id at 401 (quoting A. GUTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272 (1952).
79. See generally Slovenko, supra note 71; Slovenko, Psychotherapist-Patient Testimonial
Privilege. A Picture qf Misguided Hope, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 649 (1974).
80. See Slovenko, Psychotherapy and Confidentiality, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 375 (1975);
Note, Testimonial Privileges and the Student Counselor Relationship in Secondary Schools, 56
IOWA L. REV. 1323 (1971).
81. The dissenting opinion in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal. 3d
425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (1976) (Clark, J., dissenting), identified three interests that
are promoted by the assurance of confidentiality in the patient-psychotherapist relationship.
"First, without substantial assurance of confidentiality, those requiring treatment will be de-
terred from seeking assistance." Id at 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 39, 551 P.2d at 359. Second, the
guarantee of confidentiality is crucial to patient's willingness to disclose his or her innermost
thoughts. Only then will maximum benefits from therapy be achieved. Id Third, "even if the
patient fully discloses his thoughts, assurance that the confidential relationship will not be
chotherapeutic communications is a statutory psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege.82 Unfortunately, the majority of states, including
Pennsylvania, do not provide a specific psychotherapist-patient stat-
ute. Pennsylvania, however, does confer a testimonial privilege on
certain psychotherapeutic communications. The Pennsylvania phy-
sician-patient statute, for example, applies to psychiatrists.83 Simi-
larly, psychotherapists who are licensed psychologists are afforded
the same statutory protection 84 that attorneys possess under the at-
torney-client privilege.85 In addition to the protection afforded by
statute, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently held that commu-
nications with a psychotherapist are protected by the constitutional
right of privacy.86
Pennsylvania jurisprudence exemplifies the inconsistency in the
legal treatment of psychotherapeutic communications. On its face,
the scope of the Pennsylvania physician-patient privilege is narrower
than that of the licensed psychologist-client privilege.8 7  Conse-
quently, a psychotherapist within the ambit of the licensed psycholo-
gist category is accorded considerably more protection than a
psychotherapist-physician. As a result, persons who perform the
same functions, albeit under different titles, and persons who have
breached is necessary to maintain his trust in his psychiatrist--the very means by which treat-
ment is effected." Id
82. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (West Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 2503 (West Supp. 1981); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 19-13-7 (1979). But see In re B, Appeal
of Roth, 482 Pa. 471, 394 A.2d 410 (1978).
83. The Pennsylvania statute creating a privilege in physician-patient communications
provides,
No physician shall be allowed, in any civil matter, to disclose any information which
he acquired in attending the patient in a professional capacity, and which was neces-
sary to enable him to act in that capacity, which shall tend to blacken the character of
the patient, without consent of said patient, except in civil matters brought by such
patient for damages on account of personal injuries.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5929 (1980).
84. Pennsylvania's licensed psychologist-patient privilege is as follows:
No person who has been licensed under the act of March 23, 1972 (P.L. 136, No. 52),
to practice psychology shall be, without the written consent of his client, examined in
any civil or criminal matter as to any information acquired in the course of his pro-
fessional services in behalf of such client. The confidential relations and communica-
tions between a psychologist and his client shall be on the same basis as those
provided or prescribed by law between an attorney and client.
Id § 5944.
85. Id § 5916. In a criminal proceeding counsel shall not be competent or permitted to
testify to confidential communications made to him by his client, nor shall the client be com-
pelled to disclose the same, unless in either case this privilege is waived upon the trial by the
client.
86. In re B, Appeal of Roth, 482 Pa. 471, 394 A.2d 419 (1978). See note 154 and accom-
panying text infra
87. Although the physician-patient privilege, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5929 (1980), speaks in
terms of "any information acquired in attending the patient," the courts have held that the
statute is limited to communications received from the patient and that the statute does not
prevent disclosure of information learned by a doctor through examination or observation. In
re Phillips Estate, 295 Pa. 349, 145 A. 437 (1929). The statute requires a privilege for commu-
nications which tend to "blacken the character" of the patient. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5929
(1980). It is further limited to civil, not criminal proceedings, and only in civil proceedings in
which the patient has not put his mental condition in issue in the lawsuit. Id
an identical need for a confidential relationship, are not uniformly
accorded the testimonial privilege.
8 8
In comparison, little justification exists for the practice in most
states of permitting an extension of the privileged communications
status to psychologists and psychiatrists while denying the privilege
to rape counselors.8 9 Rape counselors, like psychologists and psychi-
atrists, are engaged in counseling and therapy. 9° "[Rape crisis vol-
unteers] are extensively trained in rape-crisis counseling. They
listen, offer support to those who call regardless of when [the] crime
occurred, and aid in providing the needed physical, psychological
and social help." 91 It is the therapeutic process and relationship that
the law of testimonial privilege seeks to protect; therefore, the func-
tion performed by a rape crisis counselor warrants the protection of
a privilege to the same extent that the function performed by a psy-
chologist or psychiatrist merits protection. 92
C. W more Test
Professor Wigmore, noted authority on rules of evidence,93 pro-
poses that four conditions must be met before a privilege is recog-
nized. Wigmore's test has received universal acceptance and
deserves mention in any examination of privileged communica-
tions.94 The Wigmore test is as follows:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed;
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties;
88. Commentators have proposed a "functional approach" to the creation and applica-
tion of a testimonial privilege to communications between patients and psychotherapists. The
crux of their argument is that protection should be guaranteed to the psychotherapeutic pro-
cess itself, rather than to any particular professional practicing psychotherapy. See Fisher,
supra note 62, at 637-41; Louissel, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World- Part I, 41 MINN.
L. REV. 731 (1957).
89. Some courts have been willing to analyze the function of the relationship, rather than
be bound by the identity of the parties, when determining whether communications are privi-
leged. For example, in Simrin v. Simrin, 233 Cal. App. 2d 90,43 Cal. Rptr. 376 (Dist. Ct. App.
1965), the California District Court of Appeals held that communications between a married
couple and a rabbi acting as a marriage counselor could not be divulged. When the husband
and wife sought the rabbi's advice, they agreed that the conversations were to be confidential.
The foundation of the Simrin decision, however, was not the priest-penitent statute, but rather
the counseling function performed by the rabbi. Id
90. As the majority in the In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape decision noted, "the
function performed by PAAR personnel resembles in some respects the function performed by
a psychotherapist." In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, - Pa. -, -- 428 A.2d 126, 130 n.2
(1981).
91. Id at -, 428 A.2d at 128 (quoting from appellant's brief).
92. See notes 83-85 and accompanying text supra.
93. See notes 95-99 and accompanying text infra.
94. For a criticism of the Wigmore test, see Comment, Functional Overlap Between the
Lawyer and Other Professionals.- Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine,
71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1229-31 (1962).
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the commu-
nity ought to be sedulouslyfostered; [and]
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation. 95
The judiciary has applied Wigmore's four point test to deter-
mine whether, in the absence of statutory guidelines, new privileges
should be fashioned. 96 Also, commentators rely on the test in ana-
lyzing whether a new professional-client relationship deserves legis-
lative protection.97 Wigmore himself maintains that all four
conditions must be present before a privilege is recognized, 9 but he
concedes that privileges have been recognized even when one of the
conditions has not been clearly satisfied.99 Applying the Wigmore
test to rape counselor-victim communications clearly demonstrates
the need for a rape counselor-victim privilege.
1 Communications Between a Rape Counselor and the Rape
Victim Originate in a Confidence that They Will Not Be Disclosed -
Victims who contact a rape crisis center are expressly advised that
the center will treat the communications between the victim and
center personnel as confidential. Brochures and leaflets advertise
that the centers provide "confidential treatment-the victim has the
exclusive right to decide who should be told."'" In addition to
widely publicizing a guarantee of confidentiality, the centers require
each staff member to sign a confidentiality statement. 10 This state-
ment provides that the counselor "agrees to treat as confidential the
identity of and all information about every person who comes to or
telephones [the center] for service, as well as all . . . records."'' 0
Consequently, a rape counselor who is subpoenaed to produce
records prejudicial to her client finds herself in a dilemma arising
from the conflict between her professional code of responsibility
0 3
95. J. WIGMORE, supra note 64, § 2285, at 527 (emphasis in original).
96. See, e.g., Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 279-80 (D.C. Cir. 1958); In re Ver-
plant, 329 F. Supp. 433, 435 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Lindsey v. People, 66 Colo. 343, 181 P. 531, 534
(1919); State v. Bixby, 27 Wash. 2d 144, 174, 177 P.2d 689, 706 (1947).
97. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 62 (psychotherapists); Robinson, supra note 76 (school
guidance counselors).
98. J. WIGMORE, supra note 64, § 2285, at 527.
99. Wigmore asserts that in the husband-wife privilege, the fourth requirement is clearly
not met. Id § 2285, at 528.
100. Pittsburgh Action Against Rape Hotline Pamphlet (on file in office of the Dickinson
Law Review).
101. See Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, Confidentiality Statement (on file in office of
the Dickinson Law Review).
102. Id
103. See Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape, Code of Professional Responsibility. Sec-
tion B, Preservation of Confidential Communications reads,
1. Confidence refers to communications protected by the rape crisis-counselor-client
privilege under applicable law.
2. The rape crisis counselor has an obligation to protect confidential communication
even after the relationship with the client terminates.
and the court order. The express intent of rape crisis centers is to
ensure confidentiality and encourage the rape victim to openly and
fully communicate. Thus, Wigmore's first condition is satisfied.
2. The Confidentiality of Communication from a Rape Victim to
Rape Crisis Counselor is Essential to the Full and Satisfactory Mainte-
nance of the Relation Between the Parties. -Victims of rape suffer a
significant degree of physical and emotional trauma during, immedi-
ately following, and after the rape."° A variety of conditions influ-
ence how the victim copes with the rape crisis, one of which is her
interaction with the rape crisis counselor.'t 5 To begin working
through the rape trauma syndrome, l06 the victim must feel that her
relationship with the counselor is based on trust and confidence.
0 7
She will then feel sufficiently secure to engage in an open discussion
of her feelings about the rape.
If a possibility exists that her communications may later be dis-
closed, the rape victim may not seek help, or if she does, she may
conceal relevant information, which could prevent the counselor
from fully serving her.'0° In addition, non-privileged communica-
tions cause counselors to refrain from maintaining victim records. 0 9
This cripples the treatment process because assessing the victim's
progress becomes difficult without complete notes by the rape coun-
selor. ' 0 Thus, if communications are not kept confidential, but are
subject to disclosure, the therapeutic relationship may be destroyed.
3. A rape crisis counselor shall not knowingly reveal confidential communications of
the client except the intention of the client to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime ...
(on file in office of the Dickinson Law Review).
104. A. BURGESS & L. HOLMSTROM, supra note 21, at 35.
105. Other factors that influence how the victim copes with the rape risis include the
victim's age, marital status, employment status, and personality type. T. CAHILL, L. MEYER &
A. FISCHMAN, THE AFTERMATH OF RAPE 58 (1979).
106. See notes 36-40 and accompanying text supra.
107. Burgess and Holmstrom note the importance of establishing an alliance between the
counselor and victim.
Through this alliance, the counselor helps the victim to understand that the interview
will be beneficial--that it is designed to aid. For the interview to progress from the
introductory phase to the working phase, victims need to see that there is something
in it for them.
A. BURGESS & L. HOLMSTROM, supra note 21, at 218.
108. The results of a study on confidentiality and its effect on interviewee behavior reveal,
"When interviewees were told that the material might not be strictly confidential, they were
less open in their disclosures than those interviewees who were given either confidential in-
structions or no special expectati6ns regarding confidentiality." Woods & McNamara, Confi-
dentiality" Its Effects on Interviewee Behavior, I I PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 714, 719 (1980).
109. Many rape counseling units avoided the consequences of the In re Pittburgh Action
Against Rape decision by not making written summaries of discussions with rape victims.
Pennsylvania Law Journal-Reporter, Feb. 9, 1981, at 5, col. 3. The Erie County Rape Crisis
Center Staff reacted to the decision by not taking direct statements or quotes from victims.
Telephone interview with Joan Martin, Director of Erie County Rape Crisis Center (Sept. 25,
1981).
110. See A. BURGESS & L. HOLMSTROM, supra note 21, at 241.
3. The Relation Must be One in which the Opinion of the Com-
munity Ought to be Sedulously Fostered -Rape crisis centers are val-
uable community resources and should be encouraged."' An
undoubtable public interest lies in helping victims of rape readjust
after the rape crisis. An equally compelling public interest is to en-
courage victims of violent crimes to come forward and report the
crime. "We would be closing our eyes to reality were we to discount
the value of rape crisis centers in fostering these vital public
interests."" 2
Victims of rape who receive immediate assistance and follow-up
counseling are more likely to cooperate in the apprehension and
prosecution of rapists."l3 Trained volunteers or staff members of the
rape crisis center often accompany the victim through major steps of
the medical and criminal justice channels." 4 Indeed, the personal
support provided by individuals at the rape centers encourages vic-
tims to complete the legal process."t 5
Rape crisis centers are also credited with fostering a change in
the attitude of many communities toward the crime of rape." 6 Pre-
viously, myths concerning rape were rampant" 7 and the resultant
attitudes adversely affected the. criminal justice system. Victims re-
fused to report the assault," I 8 police and prosecutors were insensitive
to the needs of the victim, 1 9 and the courts were not always com-
pletely impartial. 2 ° Ultimately, a climate appearing to support or,
111. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1980 at A-5, col. 11.
112. In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, - Pa. -, -, 428 A.2d 126, 130 (1981).
113. Criminal Justice Agencies also have recognized the importance of rape crisis
counseling.
Counseling probably can function in a most valuable way by offering immediate
assistance through crisis intervention. Follow up services can further assist authori-
ties by assuring the victim's continuing cooperation through all phases of the investi-
gation and prosecution of the offense.
FORCIBLE RAPE: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE RESPONSE BY POLICE, supra note 43, at 32.
114. See note 31 and accompanying text supra
115. There has been an increase in the number of rapes reported since the advent of the
rape crisis center in the early 1970s. See D. CARROW, supra note 16.
116. See N.Y. Times, supra note I11.
117. Throughout history, society has treated the typical female rape victim with suspicion
and hostility. Evidentiary laws peculiar to rape trials were based on myths that all women
wanted to be raped and were asking for it, and that no woman could be raped against her will.
See S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 311 (1975).
118. In spite of the increase in reported sexual assaults, rape remains one of the most
under-reported crimes. See note 27 supra.
119. One rape victim remarked, "If I'm ever raped again, I wouldn't report it to the police
because of all the degradation .. " Comment, The Rape Victim.- A Victim of Society and
the Law, 11 WILLLAMErTE L.J. 36, 43 (1974) (quoting Griffen, Rape: The 411-American Crime,
1971 RAMPARTS 26, 32.
120. Studies suggest that beliefs held by members of the criminal justice system may be
relevant to their conduct toward the victim and to their decisions related to the complaint.
"For example, if severity of punishment is discretionary, a judge who believes a victim's con-
duct was a cause of rape may refuse to hand down a lengthy sentence." Feldman-Summers &
Palmer, Rape as Viewed by Judges, Prosecutors, and Police Offcers, 7 C RI M. JUST. & BEHAVIOR
19, 23 (1980).
at least, to ignore rape was created.
Rape crisis centers began to use public education techniques to
dispel myths and to inform the public about the occurrence of
rapes. '2 In addition, medical and criminal justice personnel, in-
spired by rape crisis centers, revised their procedures to be more sen-
sitive to the needs of the victim.'22 Consequently, a more supportive
atmosphere was created, which facilitated interaction by victims with
law enforcement personnel.
Community interest in the benefits derived from rape crisis cen-
ters is manifested by funding from the federal government 23 and
many local agencies.' 24 Furthermore, that large number of jurisdic-
tions provide counseling services for rape victims 25 evidences the
belief that the relationship between the rape victim and the coun-
selor should be fiercely protected.
4. The Injury that would Inure to the Relationshp by the Disclo-
sure of the Communication must be Greater than the Benefit thereby
Gainedfor the Correct Disposal of Litigation. -The working thera-
peutic relation between rape counselor and victim is destroyed when
the counselor is required to testify against the victim. 26 More im-
portantly, however, if other victims were aware that the counseling
relationship had been violated, the rape counselor's role and effec-
tiveness in the community would be seriously undermined. Rape
victims would be discouraged from using the centers because of the
likelihood that any communication made to a counselor would be
used against the victim at trial.
27
The defendant's right to a fair trial must be balanced against the
harm that results from disclosure. Defense attorneys argue that a
search of the counselor's records may produce prior inconsistent
statements made by the victim. Thus, a critical determination is
whether the victim's communications are actually "statements"
within the meaning of the rules of evidence. 2  Frequently, the
121. In 1980, PAAR's education and prevention programs reached 20% more participants,
who viewed 30% more programs than were seen in the previous year. PAAR Annual Report,
1980, supra note 2.
122. See A. BURGESS & L. HOLMSTROM, supra note 21, at 81-104; D. CARROW, supra note
16, at 79-145; FORCIBLE RAPE-A NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE RESPONSE BY POLICE, Supra
note 43.
123. Federal support for rape crisis centers is available from the following sources: the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Mental Health, CETA
Funds, VISTA, and Title 20 funds. D. CARROW, supra note 16, at 197.
124. Sources of community-based financial support include local governments, charitable
organizations, local churches, YMCA, and colleges and universities. Id
125. See note 43 supra
126. See notes 105-108 and accompanying text supra
127. See note 191 and accompanying text lMVra
128. See, e.g., PA. R. CRiM. P. 305(B)(2). Rule 305(B)(2) provides for the discovery of
"written or recorded statements, and substantially verbatim oral statements .. " See also
counselor's records consist of the perceptions and interpretations of
the counselor during the interview with a rape victim. 129 These notes
are neither read nor signed by the victim.130  Analogously, some
courts hold that the handwritten notes of a police officer are not
available as statements for cross-examination. 3' In Commonwealth
v. Hustler, 132 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania declined to require
the production of an investigating officer's written report that was
based on the rape victim's statement. 33 The court recognized that
the prosecutor had turned over to defense counsel the victim's for-
mal statement and held that the investigative report could not be
considered a statement of the witness because the report "did not
consist of verbatim notes of the victim's own words. . . .,,13 Simi-
larly, a rape counselor's notes should be outside the scope of the de-
fense's review.
Granting a testimonial privilege between a rape victim and
counselor will not hinder a determination of the truth when evidence
is available from other sources. Indeed, defense attorneys have ac-
cess to other records that are more likely to facilitate the detection of
inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim. These sources include
police records, 35 medical reports, 36 and preliminary hearing tran-
scripts.' Therefore, the injury that would inure to the rape victim-
counselor relationship is far greater than the benefit gained by dis-
closure. Clearly, Wigmore's four criteria are satisfied and provide a
solid basis for recognition of the rape victim-crisis counselor
privilege.
Comment, Pretrial Discovery and Inspection-New Criminal Rules/or Pennsylvania, 23 VILL. L.
REV. 308, 319 (1978).
129. Telephone interview with Ann Pride, Director of Pittsburgh Action Against Rape
(Sept. 9, 1981). See also Pittsburgh Action Against Rape: Initial Report Form (the Initial
Report Form is filled out by the rape counselor after the initial interview with victim-the
form is in checklist format) (on file in office of The Dickinson Law Review).
130. Telephone Interview, supra note 129.
131. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wade, 480 Pa. 160, 389 A.2d 560 (1978) (plurality opin-
ion); Commonwealth v. Hill, 267 Pa. Super. Ct.'264, 406 A.2d 796 (1979); Commonwealth v.
Bellis, 252 Pa. Super. Ct. 15, 380 A.2d 1258 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 484 Pa. 486, 399
A.2d 397 (1979); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 269 A.2d 882 (1970).
132. 243 Pa. Super. Ct. 200, 364 A.2d 940 (1976).
133. Id at 203, 364 A.2d at 941.
134. Id
135. In many rape cases, a brief interview with the victim by the police takes place at the
scene of the crime or at the hospital: A follow-up interview is also conducted. See A. BUR-
GESS & L. HOLMSTROM supra note 21, at 83-86; FORCIBLE RAPE-FINAL PROJECT REPORT,
supra note 37, at 47-57.
136. The victim's hospital record, with or without testimony from the hospital staff that
treated the victim, is used to corroborate or weaken the victim's claim of rape. For a discus-
sion of hospital protocol when treating rape victims see A. BURGESS & L. HOLMSTROM, supra
note 21, at 105-32.
137. The victim is questioned by the district attorney and then is cross-examined by the
defense lawyer at the preliminary hearing. See A. BURGESS & L. HOLMSTROM, supra note 21,
at 297-318; FORCIBLE RAPE-FINAL PROJECT REPORT, supra note 37, at 52.
IV. Competing Constitutional Considerations
The true importance of a rape victim-crisis counselor testimo-
nial privilege is the protection it affords to the victim's right to pri-
vacy. Against this privacy right, however, one must balance the rape
defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial. Effectuation of this
balance requires an analysis of the extent and scope of the two com-
peting rights.
A. The Rape Victim's Right to Privacy
The United States Constitution contains no specific provision
guaranteeing the right to privacy. The Supreme Court, however, has
clearly recognized the existence of this privacy right, which emanates
from the first amendment, 1 38 the fourth and fifth amendments, 139 the
penumbras of the Bill of Rights," and the ninth amendment. 4 '
Furthermore, in Roe v. Wade ' 42 the Court tied the right to privacy to
the fourteenth amendment "concept of ordered liberty.' 43 In addi-
tion to the privacy interests protected by particular provisions of the
Constitution, the right of privacy protects at least two interests-the
"individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters"' 44
and the interest "in making certain kinds of important decisions." 
145
Under the latter category, personal decisions concerning marriage,
family life, childbearing, and childrearing have been held to come
within the constitutional zone of privacy.
146
138. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (banning prosecution for possessing
obscene materials in the home); NAACP v. Button, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (court held unconstitu-
tional a demand by the State of Alabama that an association reveal the names and addresses of
all of its members and agents).
139. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (government's eavesdropping
activities violated petitioners' justifiable expectation of privacy); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961) (majority found the exclusionary rule to be an essential part of the right to privacy).
140. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 361 U.S. 479 (1965). The majority suggested that
"specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance. . . .The present case, then, concerns a
relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees." Id at 484-85.
141. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren, Justice Brennan, and Justice
Goldberg emphasized the importance of the ninth amendment: "To hold that a right so basic
and fundamental and so deep-rooted in our society as the right of privacy in marriage may be
infringed. . . is to ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever." Id at
491 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
142. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (court struck down criminal abortion law because it interfered
with women's right of privacy).
143. Id at 153. The court reasoned, "This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we
feel it is . . .is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy." Id
144. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1976). See notes 148-151 and accompanying
text infra.
145. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1976).
146. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraception); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (procreation);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (childrearing and education).
Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized
that a right to privacy exists in the Pennsylvania Constitution. The
court stated that "[the] privacy interest is the interest in avoiding dis-
closure of personal matters. This privacy interest finds explicit pro-
tection in the Pennsylvania Constitution, art. 1, § 1 . . . ." "
The United States Supreme Court decision in Whalen v. Roe'48
is crucial to the concept of confidential privileges. In Whalen, the
Court focused on the extent to which a medical patient may with-
hold information that he does not wish to share with others. The
Whalen Court reaffirmed the importance of a privacy right.149 Ulti-
mately, the Court upheld a statute permitting state collection of in-
formation concerning dangerous drug prescriptions. In its opinion,
however, the Court critically examined the asserted legislative pur-
pose of the scheme 5 ° and heavily relied upon elaborate safe-
guards' 5' designed to protect individual privacy.
A comparison of the limited disclosure required in Whalen with
the disclosure at trial of rape counselor notes reveals the invasiveness
of the latter. The information offered by the victim in crisis counsel-
ing is more intensely personal than general medical data, and its
release is potentially more harmful to the victim. Because of the per-
sonal nature of rape victim-counselor communications, the release of
this information threatens the victim's right of privacy more seri-
ously than the disclosure of information regarding drug
prescriptions.
Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that the
constitutionally based right to privacy protects the confidences of
therapy.'5 2 In In re B, Appeal ofRoth, "I the court reversed a con-
tempt citation on the ground that the constitutional right of privacy
protects psychotherapist-patient communications from involuntary
disclosure. The case concerned a juvenile delinquency proceeding.
During the course of the proceeding, court personnel discovered that
the juvenile's mother had received psychiatric treatment. Conse-
quently, the court ordered the mother's psychiatrist to turn over the
records. Without consent of the mother, the doctor refused to do so
147. In re June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 490 Pa. 143, 151, 415
A.2d 73, 77 (1980). See also Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 403 A.2d 1283 (1979).
148. 429 U.S. 589 (1976).
149. The Court stated, "We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the ac-
cumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other mas-
sive government files." Id at 605.
150. Id at 597.
151. Id at 594-95.
152. Only three jurisdictions have recognized a constitutionally based psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege. See Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cit. 1976); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal.
3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970); In re B, Appeal of Roth, 482 Pa. 471, 394 A.2d
410 (1978).
153. 482 Pa. 471, 394 A.2d 410 (1978).
and was cited for contempt. Noting that psychotherapy requires pa-
tients to reveal the most intimate aspects of their lives, the court con-
cluded that "disclosure of information revealed in the context of a
psychotherapist-patient relationship has deeper roots than the Penn-
sylvania doctor-patient privilege statute, and that the patient's right
to prevent disclosure of such information is constitutionally
based." 5 4
Subsequent Pennsylvania cases clarified the scope of the privacy
right. In Commonwealth ex rel Platt v. Platt, "I the superior court
held that a patient's communications with a psychiatrist were not
protected from disclosure by a constitutional right to privacy. 1 56 The
doctor-patient relationship in Platt, however, differed greatly from
the In re B relationship. The patient in In re B voluntarily entered
into a psychotherapeutic relationship with her doctor, thereby justi-
fying her legitimate expectation of privacy. In contrast, the patient
in Platt was involuntarily committed and examined by a psychiatrist
pursuant to the commitment statute.157 More importantly, this pa-
tient had no legitimate expectation that the communications would
be privileged. "Indeed, the very fact that this relationship with his
doctors had been coerced, and not voluntarily assumed, weakens the
reasonableness of any belief that absolute confidence will be main-
tained."'' '5 Consequently, the court in Platt held that the patient's
right to privacy must give way to the interests of society in having
that person treated.' 9
In the 1980 case of In re June 1979 Allegheny County Investigat-
ing Grand Jury, 160 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recognized
the existence of a right to privacy with respect to medical records.
Nevertheless, the court ordered production of hospital medical
records for a criminal grand jury proceeding. Because the grand
jury statute required secrecy, 16 the court felt justified in removing
the records from their constitutionally protected status. The court
cautioned, however, that disclosure of medical records "could, under
certain circumstances, pose such a serious threat to a patient's right
not to have personal matters revealed that it would be impermissible
under either the United States Constitution or the Pennsylvania
154. Id at 485, 394 A.2d at 425.
155. 266 Pa. Super. Ct. 267, 404 A.2d 410 (1979).
156. Id at 290, 404 A.2d at 417.
157. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7301 (Purdon Supp. 1981) (Involuntary Examination and
Treatment).
158. 266 Pa. Super. Ct. at 311, 404 A.2d at 428 (concurring and dissenting opinion).
159. Id at 290, 404 A.2d at 416.
160. 490 Pa. 143, 415 A.2d 73 (1980).
161. Section 8(b) of the Investigating Grand Jury Act provides, with certain limited sec-
tions, that persons involved in grand jury proceedings are sworn to secrecy and will be in
contempt of court if they reveal any information that they are sworn to keep secret. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 272 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
Constitution." 162
Clearly, the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions pro-
vide for a right to privacy in order to prevent the unwarranted dis-
closure of personal matters. Because of the intensely personal nature
of the information revealed in rape counseling, the constitutional
right of privacy should logically extend to the rape victim-crisis
counselor relationship. A rape victim receives assurances of confi-
dentiality and has a high expectation that the personal information
revealed in therapy will remain confidential. '63 Furthermore, the re-
sultant harm from disclosure of this sensitive information could seri-
ously interfere with the rape victim-crisis counselor relationship. 164
B. The Accused's Right to Confrontation
The sixth amendment grants a defendant in a criminal trial the
right to confront adverse witnesses and to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor. 165 Courts, however, have held
that the defendant's right to confrontation is not absolute. 166 A strik-
ing example is the privilege protecting the anonymity of police in-
formers. In a landmark case, Roviaro v. United States, 167 the United
States Supreme Court held that the government did have a sufficient
interest in preserving the confidentiality of its sources to support an
"informer's privilege."' 68 The Court went on to limit the scope of
the privilege by "the fundamental requirements of fairness"' 69 and
"the individual's right to prepare his defense."'
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Arguably, the accused in a rape trial may wish to produce evi-
dence that statements made by the victim to her counselor were in-
consistent with the victim's testimony at trial. A rape victim-crisis
counselor testimonial privilege, however, would not seriously inter-
fere with the defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation.
162. 490 Pa. at 151, 415 A.2d at 78.
163. See notes 100-103 and accompanying text supra.
164. See notes 108-110 and accompanying text supra
165. The sixth amendment reads in part as follows: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him; [and) to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .. " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
166. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Commonwealth v. Jackson, 457 Pa. 237,
324 A.2d 350 (1974) that
[tihe right to compulsory process encompasses the right to meet the prosecution's case
with the aid of witnesses, and the right to elicit the aid of the Commonwealth in
securing those witnesses at trial, both of which are fundamental to a fair trial. This
constitutional right, though fundamental, is not, however, absolute. Evidentiary rules
based on legitimate state interests which exclude certain witnesses or certain testimony
are not inconsistent nor incompatible with the right to compulsory process.
Id at 239, 324 A.2d at 354-55 (emphasis added). See also Commonwealth v. Royster, 472 Pa.
581, 372 A.2d 1194 (1977). See generally Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
167. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
168. Id at 59.
169. Id at 60.
170. Id at 62.
Until recently, courts rarely allowed the confrontation clause to
override testimonial privileges created by common law or statute.' 7'
Then, the United States Supreme Court decision in Davis v.
,4laska'72 prompted some state courts to require "testimony of the
witness in derogation of a privilege, on the theory that nothing less
would do to protect the constitutional right of the accused."'' 73  In
Davis, the defendant's constitutional right under the confrontation
clause outweighed the state interest in protecting the confidentiality
of juvenile offender records.' 74  The concurring opinion, however,
urged a very limited reading of the majority opinion.
175
In broadly extending Davis, state courts 7 6 have shown little re-
spect for the policies behind the derogated privileges. '7' The United
States Supreme Court has not yet ruled that communication privi-
leges must consistently yield to sixth amendment rights.' 78  There-
fore, state courts should carefully weigh the value of the conflicting
privilege before requiring disclosure of communications.
To the extent that a rape victim-crisis counselor privilege is con-
stitutionally based on the right to privacy, 17 it would be less vulner-
able to a sixth amendment challenge than other similar statutory
privileges.' 8 ° The additional protection expected to accompany this
constitutionally based privilege would weigh heavily in a court's de-
termination of a criminal defense exception to the privilege claim. 81
C Resolving the Conflict
There is never any easy way to balance competing claims of
171. See Hill, Testimonial Privilege and Fair Trial, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1173 (1980); Note,
Defendant v. Witness. Measuring Confrontation and Compulsory Process Rights Against Statu-
tory Communications Privileges, 30 STAN. L. REV. 935 (1978).
172. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
173. Hill, supra note 171, at 1173.
174. 415 U.S. at 320.
175. Justice Stewart, in the concurring opinion, stated,
The court holds that, in the circumstances of this case, the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments conferred the right to cross-examine a particular prosecution witness
about his delinquency adjudication for burglary. . . .Such cross-examination was
necessary in this case. . . .I would emphasize that the Court neither holds nor sug-
gests that the Constitution confers a right in every case to impeach the credibility of a
witness through cross-examination about his past delinquency adjudications or crimi-
nal convictions.
Id at 321 (Stewart, J., concurring).
176. See, e.g., Salazar v. State, 559 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1976) (spousal privilege); State v.
Hembd, 305 Minn. 120, 232 N.W.2d 872 (1975) (physician-patient privilege); State v. Farrow,
116 N.H. 731, 366 A.2d 1177 (1976) (statutory privilege for physicians, surgeons, and
psychologists).
177. See, e.g., Salazar v. State, 559 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1976); State v. Hembd, 305 Minn. 120,
232 N.W.2d 872 (1975). See also Note, supra note 171, at 963-69.
178. See Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1980);
Hill supra note 171.
179. See notes 148-164 and accompanying text supra.
180. See Note, supra note 171, at 937 n.ll; Smith, supra note 178, at 56.
181. See Note, supra note 171, at 937 n.1l; Smith, supra note 178, at 56.
constitutional dimension. In resolving the conflict between the rape
victim's right to privacy and the defendant's sixth amendment claim,
the government will inevitably compromise one constitutional right
in order to promote another. 8 2 Because the confidences of therapy
are of an extremely sensitive nature and because less restictive alter-
natives1 3 of obtaining information are available to the defendant,
the rape victim's right to privacy should prevail.
8 4
V. Development of the Rape Victim-Crisis Counselor Privilege
in Pennsylvania
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in the In re Pittsburgh Action
Against Rape decision,' granted limited protection to confidential
communications between a rape victim and the crisis counselor.
While refusing to create an absolute privilege,' 186 the majority never-
theless did not allow the accused complete access to rape counselor
files.' 87 "Only statements of the complainant, and not interpreta-
182. Courts have not yet resolved the conflict between the right of privacy and the defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial. An area that bears some resemblance to the consti-
tutional issue at hand, however, is that of "rape shield laws." A Pennsylvania statute, typical
of such laws, bars a rape defendant from introducing evidence of the victim's past sexual
conduct or reputation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3106 (Purdon Supp. 1981). In Common-
wealth v. Strube, 274 Pa. Super. Ct. 199,418 A.2d 365 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 992 (1980),
the court held subpart (b) of the Pennsylvania Rape Shield Law constitutional. Subpart (b)
requires the court to order an in camera hearing and make findings regarding the admissibility
of evidence on the victim's past sexual conduct. The court recognized that the introduction of
evidence at trial of a victim's past sexual conduct "has a highly traumatic and embarrassing
effect on the complaining witness." Id at 207, 418 A.2d at 369. "[Tihe raison d'etre of [rape
shield laws] is to partially correct the manner in which our system has approached the victim
of sexual assault." Id at 204, 418 A.2d at 367.
183. The defense in a rape case has access to sufficient non-privileged evidence to accom-
plish the same evidentiary purpose. See notes 135-137 and accompanying text supra. Cf. Com-
monwealth v. Hayes, 489 Pa. 419, 426, 414 A.2d 318, 321, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 803 (1980) (in
balancing defendant's sixth amendment rights against the public right to access, the court
adopted an approach based on a least restrictive alternative theory).
184. In addition to competing constitutional considerations, a further consideration arises
with the rape victim-crisis counselor testimonial privilege-one who is denied the privilege
may have standing under the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.
Wealthier victims who can afford the services of a psychiatrist or psychologist have their confi-
dences respected. In contrast, although the nature of the communications is the same, the rape
victim who is unable to afford the services of a licensed professional is denied privacy when
she turns to a rape crisis center. To deny a privilege to a rape crisis counselor distinguishes
between those who are able to afford professional treatment and those who are not. See Com-
ment, Underprivileged Communications-Extension of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege to
Patients of Psychiatric Social Workers, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1050, 1060-1067 (1973).
185, - Pa. -- 428 A.2d 126 (1981).
186. Id at -, 428 A.2d at 127. In rejecting the claim for absolute privilege, the majority
was guided by the "executive privilege" case of United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
In NLron, the Supreme Court unanimously refused to permit the former President's "genera-
lized interest in confidentiality" of presidential communications to prevail over "fundamental
demands of due process of law in the fair administration of justice." Id at 709.
187. The PAAR court concluded,
We cannot rule out the possibility that statements contained in a PAAR file may have
no bearing whatsoever on the facts of the alleged offense and may relate instead only
to the valuable counseling services which PAAR provides. Such statements reflecting
counseling shall be withheld from defense inspection.
In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, - Pa. -, -, 428 A.2d 126, 132 (1981).
tions or recollections of the PAAR counselor [were] to be made
available."' 8  In addition, the court expressly demanded that pro-
ceedings to determine the admissibility of proposed evidence be held
in camera. 189 The dissenting opinion asserted, however, that the in
camera procedure would be difficult to apply.' 9 °
The privilege defined by the court in In re PAAR was a step in
the right direction, but was inadequate because it afforded less than
full protection to communications between the rape victim and a cri-
sis counselor. 19 In addition, inconsistent rulings made after In re
PAAR evidenced the confusion surrounding judicial application of
the privilege.' 92 Consequently, the Pennsylvania General Assembly,
in response to increasing pressure from rape crisis centers, enacted a
rape victim-crisis counselor privilege. 193
Act 169, signed by the Governor on December 23, 1981, creates
an absolute privilege for communications between rape victims and
rape crisis counselors. 94 The statute provides the following:
188. Id at -, 428 A.2d at 132. For a definition of "statement," as defined by the PAAR
court, see notes 6 & 7 and accompanying text supra.
189. Id An in camera hearing allows the judge to examine the privileged evidence outside
the presence of the jury. Moreover, having examined the privileged evidence, the judge can
assess more accurately its relevancy and the defendant's need for it. For a thorough discussion
of in camera proceedings see Note, supra note 171, at 976-91.
190. The dissent argued the following viewpoint:
[Tlhe majority limitation will be difficult to apply. When the victim ruminates 'I
don't know. Maybe my dress was too tight. Maybe it was my fault' in a state of
depression and shame, is that a statement bearing only on the facts of the offense, or
a statement reflecting counseling? ... Many courts might err in favor of the defend-
ant. It matters not that an appellate court later holds that the communications were
not statements.. . the damage would have been done and would be irreversible.
In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, - Pa. -, -, 428 A.2d 126, 149 (1981).
191. The following excerpt is from representative sampling of affidavits assessing the im-
pact of the PAAR decision:
Ms. Hayes' statement discloses that nine PAAR clients have, since this case has been
made public, asked for all records of contact with PAAR to be destroyed (with obvi-
ous destructive implications for the relationship). In addition, from January 1980 -
June 1980, the average percentage of anonymous calls was 37%. Following the media
coverage of this case, 61% of emergency calls were anonymous, the callers afraid to
trust PAAR to maintain confidentiality. One woman stopped all sessions because of
anxiety over possible disclosure of her communication.
Affidavit of Patricia M. Hayes, Counseling Coordinator at PAAR. Brief of PAAR, Exhibit D
'quoted in In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, - Pa. -, -, 428 A.2d 126, 147 n.2 (1981).
192. Notes from discussion by participants on Rape Crisis Counselor-Rape Victim Confi-
dentiality, The Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape Meeting (March 3, 1981), demonstrate
the inconsistencies in trial judge's rulings.
1. Portions of Rape Crisis Center data forms being turned over to defense counsel
even after counselor states forms contain only recollections.
2. Inability of Rape Crisis Counselor or District Attorney to raise objections to files
already in courts' hands from being turned over to defense (lacked standing).
3. If the rape victim shown records by the center, court may interpret as acceptance
by the victim that they are own statement, thus satisfying definitional criteria of
verbatim statement.
Telephone interview with Karen Paris, Executive Director of Pennsylvania Coalition Against
Rape (Oct. 7, 1981).
193. See notes 194-204 and accompanying text il'a
194. See Amendment to the Act of Nov. 25, 1970, Act No. 169, 1981 Pa. Legis. Serv. - (to
be codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5945.1). See also note 10 supra.
A sexual assault counselor has a privilege not to be examined as a
witness in any civil or criminal proceeding without the prior writ-
ten consent of the victim being counseled by the counselor as to
any confidential communication made by the victim to the coun-
selor or as to any advice, report or working paper given or made
in the course of the consultation.
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This statutory privilege thus abolishes the limitations placed on the
rape victim-counselor privilege by the In re PAAR court.
With the enactment of Act 169, Pennsylvania becomes only the
second state to provide a statutory privilege protecting rape victim-
crisis counselor communications. California created the first statu-
tory privilege in 1980.96 The California statute, like the Penn-
sylvania act, protects communications between the rape victim'9 7
and the sexual assault counselor,' 98 including information regarding
the victim's sexual conduct or reputation. 99 Advice given by the
195. Id at § 5945.1(b).
196. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1035 (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
197. The Pennsylvania and California statutes define the term "victim" almost identically.
The California provision states, "As used in this article, 'victim' means a person who consults a
sexual assault counselor for the purpose of securing advice or assistance concerning a mental,
physical, or emotional condition caused by a sexual assault." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1035 (West
Cum. Supp. 1961). Compare Amendment to the Act of November 25, 1970, Act No. 169, 1981
Pa. Legis. Serv. - (to be codified at 42 PA, CONS. STAT. § 5945.1(a)) with CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1035 (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
198. The California privilege provides explicit criteria for identifying who qualifies as a
"sexual assault counselor."
As used in this article, 'sexual assault victim counselor' means a person who is
engaged in any office, hospital, institution, or center commonly known as a rape crisis
center, whose primary purpose is the rendering of advice or assistance to victims of
sexual assault and who is registered as a sexual assault victim counselor with the
Division of Allied Health Professions of the Board of Medical Quality Assurance.
To register, a sexual assault counselor shall meet one of the following requirements:
(a) Be a psychotherapist as defined in Section 1010; or have a master's degree in
counseling or a related field; or have two years of supervised counseling experience,
at least one of which is in rape crisis counseling; or
(b) Have 40 hours of training as described below and be supervised by an indi-
vidual who qualifies as a counselor under subdivision (a). The training, to be super-
vised by a person qualified under subdivision (a), shall include, but not be limited to,
the following areas: law, medicine, societal attitudes, crisis intervention and counsel-
ing techniques, role playing, referral services, and sexuality.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1035.2 (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
The Pennsylvania definition, in comparison, is less restrictive.
"Sexual assault counselor." A person who is engaged in any office, institution or
center defined as a rape crisis center under this section, who has undergone 40 hours
of training and is under the control of a direct services supervisor of a rape crisis
center, whose primary purpose is the rendering of advice, counseling or assistance to
victims of sexual assault.
Amendment of the Act of Nov. 25, 1970, Act No. 169, 1981 Pa. Legis. Serv. - (to be codified
at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5945.1(a)).
199. California's statute extends a privilege to confidential communications between the
sexual assault counselor and the victim, which is defined as follows:
As used in this article, "confidential communication between the sexual assault
counselor and the victim" means information transmitted between the victim and the
sexual assault counselor in the course of their relationship and in confidence by a
means which, so far as the victim is aware, discloses the information to no third
persons other than those who are present to further the interests of the victim in the
consultation or those to whom disclosures are reasonably necessary for the transmis-
sion of the information or an accomplishment of the purposes for which the sexual
assault counselor is consulted. The term includes all information regarding the vic-
sexual assault counselor on potential testimony in court, however, is
not considered a confidential communication.2 °°
The two statutory provisions differ on who actually holds the
privilege. Under the California provisions, the privilege to refuse or
prevent disclosure can be claimed by the rape victim, a person au-
thorized by the rape victim, or the sexual assault counselor under
delineated circumstances. 20 ' The Pennsylvania privilege extends di-
rectly to the sexual assault counselor, but a communication cannot
be revealed without the rape victim's prior written consent.202
A further distinction between the two statutory privileges con-
cerns the procedure for resolving disputes whether a communication
is confidential. The Pennsylvania act provides no guidelines. The
California statute, on the other hand, permits a defendant to make
an offer of proof of the relevancy of the alleged confidential commu-
nication.20 3 If the offer is sufficient, the trial court will hold a hear-
ing outside the jury's presence to determine whether the
communication may be introduced. 2"
tim's prior or subsequent sexual conduct, and opinions regarding the victim's sexual
conduct or reputation in sexual matters. The term does not include advice given by
the sexual assault counselor on potential testimony in court.
Information received by the sexual assault counselor which constitutes relevant
evidence of the facts and circumstances involving an alleged sexual assault about
which the victim is complaining and which is the subject of a criminal proceeding is
not confidential communication.
CAL. EvID. CODE § 1035.4 (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
200. Id
201. Section 1035.6 provides as follows:
A victim of a sexual assault, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to
disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication be-
tween the victim and a sexual assault victim counselor if the privilege is claimed by:
(a) The holder of the privilege;
(b) A person who is authorized to claim the privilege by the holder of the privi-
lege; or
(c) The person who was the sexual assault victim counselor at the time of the
confidential communication, but such person may not claim the privilege if there is
no holder of the privilege in existence or if he is otherwise instructed by a person
authorized to permit disclosure.
Id at § 1035.6. The statute further provides that "[tihe sexual assault counselor who received
or made a communication subject to the privilege under this article shall claim the privilege
whenever he is present when the communication is sought to be disclosed and is authorized to
claim the privilege under subdivision (c) of Section 1035.8." Id
202. Amendment of the Act of Nov. 25, 1970, Act No. 169, 1981 Pa. Legis. Serv. - (to be
codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5945.1 (b)). Section 5945.1(b) states,
A sexual assault counselor has a privilege not to be examined as a witness in any civil
or criminal proceeding without the prior written consent of the victim being coun-
seled by the counselor as to any confidential communication made by the victim to
the counselor or as to any advice, report or working paper given or made in the
course of the consultation.
203. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1035.4(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1981) provides for offers of proof.
In the event of a dispute regarding what is or is not a confidential communica-
tion, the following procedure shall be followed:
(1) A written motion shall be made by the defendant to the court and prosecutor
stating that the defense has an offer of proof of the relevancy of evidence containing
prior inconsistent statements for the purposes of impeachment or evidence that any
element of the offense charged is not present.
204. Id at § 1035.4(3). Section 1035.4(4) further provides,
VI. Conclusion
Clearly, policy considerations, the Wigmore test, and the protec-
tions granted by the United States Constitution indicate that a testi-
monial privilege for rape victims and rape crisis counselors is legally
appropriate and desirable. This privilege is a natural extension of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege, with the resulting confidential-
ity helping to fulfill the sexual assault counselor's function. Addi-
tionally, recognition of the rape victim-crisis counselor privilege
founded on the constitutional right of privacy is long overdue.
Only two states, Pennsylvania and California, recognize a privi-
lege for rape victim-crisis counselor communications. Prior to Penn-
sylvania's statutory enactment, a limited judicially created privilege
protected these private and personal communications. The judicial
privilege, although an advancement for rape crisis centers, damaged
the therapeutic process of center programs. A further undesirable
result was the inconsistent rulings made by the trial courts.
To curb the detrimental effects on the rape victim-counselor re-
lationship due to disclosure, 20 5 Pennsylvania joined California in en-
acting an absolute privilege in communications between the rape
victim and the sexual assault counselor. Failure to extend this statu-
tory privilege would have seriously jeopardized the effectiveness and
quality of the services provided at the twenty-seven Pennsylvania
rape crisis centers. The adoption of a similar privilege, either judi-
cially or statutorily, in the forty-eight states that do not yet recognize
a rape victim-crisis counselor privilege would greatly assist rape cri-
sis centers throughout the United States in fulfilling their goals.
CARRIE J. SCARMEAS
At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court finds that evidence proposed to be
offered by the defendant regarding the sexual conduct of the complaining witness is
relevant pursuant to Section 780, and is admissible pursuant to Section 352, the court
may make an order stating what evidence may be introduced by the defendant, and
the nature of the questions to be permitted. The defendant may then offer evidence
pursuant to the order of the court.
205. See notes 191-92 and accompanying text supra
